THE PHYSICIANS.

A SATIRE.

WITH OTHER

POEMS.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

A SPECIMEN

OF AN

ENQUIRY concerning the MIND.

THE SECOND EDITION.

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THE

PREFACE.

THE occaſion of the following little poem was, the appearance of one of a ſimilar caſt in the Public Ledger; of which the editor was pleaſed to expreſs his approbation, by deſiring ſome more of the ſame kind. To comply with his requeſt I ſat about this piece; but found the matter encreaſe ſo much upon me, that I judged it over-long for the limits of a news-paper, and

therefore have choſen this method of publication. What ſucceſs it will meet with, is left for experience to determine. I have endeavored, as much as poſſible, to make it a good-humoured laughable ſatire; for I judge it the moſt ſucceſsful method to "laugh folly out of countenance," invective being more apt to irritate than reform.

The characters are, I preſume, ſufficiently marked. If I have expoſed any new folly, and been ſucceſsful enough to render it ridiculous, I have my aim.

I have

I have ſubjoined the piece above alluded to; and here take the opportunity to thank the editor of the Ledger for ſome judicious corrections; as alſo for the encomiums beſtowed on it. I have alſo added another little piece, which appeared ſome years ago in the London-Evening poſt.

THE PHYSICIANS.

A SATIRE.

SCENE.

*The Vicar of ***'s Parlour.*

The VICAR and a PHYSICIAN appearing in Converſation.

PHYSICIAN.

——— YOUR family—how large?—

VICAR.

Only three ſons,—(our ſecond father's care),
And very promiſing young lads they are;
Whoſe future welfare now employs my head,
For they, you know, muſt live when I am dead.
JACKY, my heir, will have a good eſtate,
So nothing need be ſaid of JACKY's fate:

My

My ſecond ſon (a parſon) is deſign'd
To hold the living, I ſhall leave behind:
But TOMMY!—nothing runs in TOMMY's brain
But he'll be one of ÆSCULAPIUS' train!
Smit with their ſtate, ambitious to look big,
And wear a doctor's coat and doctor's wig.

The lad, though but eleven, nay hardly that,
Reads like a parſon, writes like copper-plate,
Learns mathematics with ſurpriſing glee,
Has paſt diviſion and the rule of three!
Next ſpring I mean to move him from old *HOOLE,
And ſend him up to †NEWCOMB's grammar-ſchool;
In claſſic learning there his fate to ſeek,
And get him vers'd in Latin, French, and Greek.
From thence to Cambridge I the boy ſhall ſend,
There half a dozen years at leaſt to ſpend;
In every art, though diſtantly ally'd
To phyſic, to be duly qualify'd.

* A noted writing-maſter in the vicar's pariſh.
† At Hackney.

A rigid

A rigid regular ſhall THOMAS be,
Nor e'er ſhall quit the ſeat of arts, till he
Has taken up with honor his degree.
Which having done, his ſtudies to complete
He next ſhall go to Leyden, phyſic's ſeat.
And then his merit further to enhance,
Shall ſpend another year or two in France.
Nor yet at Glaſgow ſhall neglect to touch,
Doctors of practice cannot ſee too much.
Next lectures—hoſpitals—

PHYSICIAN.

——————————Hold! Hold! my friend,
TOM of his ſtudies ne'er will ſee an end!
Why, at the rate you mean to go about,
Two thouſand pounds will hardly bear you out!
But ceaſe this rant,—I'll put you in a way,
A hundred ſhall the whole expence defray.

VICAR.

Indeed!—But right;—forgive me;—You whoſe cares
Have been employ'd in phyſic many years,

And in the trade have gain'd, beyond diſpute,
The greateſt fortune, and renown to boot,
Are certainly the fitteſt in the nation
To give the mode of TOMMY's education.

PHYSICIAN.

Phyſicians thus at college *us'd* to lurk,
But now we go a nearer way to work;
Of late years, thanks to ** and fineſſe,
Not only charges, but the time is leſs.

And why to NEWCOMB's ſend him?—here's a freak!—
Have doctors uſe for Latin, French, or Greek?
Tongues grown ſo ſtale, pedantic, and abſurd,
That few phyſicians underſtand a word!
Nor have they need of 'em;—thoſe books have long
Been all tranſlated in our mother tongue;
Th' originals, what doctor now can read?—
They have them in their libraries indeed,
Not to peruſe, believe me, but for ſhow;
To make believe, at leaſt, they ſomething know.

Improve-

Improvement, Sir, is never at a ſtay;
The world grows wiſe, and wiſer every day:
Witneſs how plain to phyſic's pav'd the way.
This art which once requir'd ſuch mighty pains,
Such ſtudy, and ſuch racking of the brains,
So eaſy now is made, that men learn more
In half a year, than once in half a ſcore!

VICAR.

But what!—is Latin uſeleſs to the tribe?
Without it, how, I pray, can you preſcribe?—

PHYSICIAN.

That I'll reſolve you ſoon.—Our recepe's
'Tis true, are wrote in Latin, ſuch as 'tis,—
For one who Latin books did never ſee
Might write it very ſoon as well as we.
To write at length, obſerve, is thought abſurd,
A ſyllable—a letter of a word:
We tell you 'tis for ſhortneſs and diſguiſe,
And to conceal our art from vulgar eyes;

But here's the truth—change art for ignorance,
To ſhortneſs add, "of knowledge,"—and you'll hence
Have our whole reaſon in its proper ſenſe.

But take a ſpecimen.—I write, you ſee,
"Cap. q. n. m. o. n. h. s., or d."
I own I can't complete it, ſhould I try,
Nor half the college, any more than I.

I am retir'd from buſineſs, therefore ſafe,
At how I've humm'd the world with you may laugh:
I know nor Greek nor Latin; and have read
Ev'n Engliſh authors very few indeed!
Juſt got their names, and hiſtories, from FRIEND,
To ſerve for chit-chat—for no other end.
'Tis not by learning we phyſicians raiſe,
By other arts we catch the people's eyes;
The force of mere abilities is ſmall,
'Tis front, appearance, and addreſs is all;
* Who for learning bore ſuch high repute,
Starves in obſcurity, and walks on foot;

And

And many other Cambridge-men we ſee
Who find it juſt as hard to live as he;
While empty * with front, addreſs and wig,
Rides in his coach! his fame and fortune big.
The reaſon too is plain; your youths at college
Are ſo intent on heaping up of knowledge,
That they've no time to practice, and get known
Thoſe outward arts which ſo engage the town;
And folks can only judge of what is ſeen,
The mere exterior—not the head within.
This ⁂, *, *, and * * * can tell,
Who know the maxim's force extremely well.

Men in all arts in ſome things cheat our eyes,
And every trade has got its *myſteries*;
Ours too is cloath'd with like myſterious air,
(For ev'n the trade of phyſic cheats its ſhare),
Thus, I am call'd for inſtance to a caſe;
I go in all the forms of dreſs and face;
Enquire the ſymptoms,—patients pulſe I feel,
"You underſtand the caſe"—"Extremely well."—

For

For if but in the leaſt you ſeem to doubt,
" The doctor knows not what he is about;"
With pen and ink my ready hand I arm,
And order what will do nor good nor harm;
If nature can her part ſucceſsful play,
'Tis I with all the honor run away;
But if the ſick grows worſe and worſe, or dies,
A thouſand reaſons inſtantly will riſe,—
Caught cold—the fault at nurſes threſhold lies!

I paint a patient bad as ere I can,
" The caſe is deſp'rate—he's a dying man."—
Then if he dies—" Why he's a prophet ſure!"
But if he lives—" God bleſs me!—what a cure!"—

The friends, perhaps, are anxious to be told
What's his diſorder—that I can't unfold;
Yet put 'em off with ſome hard myſtic name,
It goes down!—right or wrong, 'tis all the ſame.

As Tom is deſtin'd to a doctor's fate,
Mark well his cloathing, much depends on that.

To

To make him look of conſequence and big,
Get him a large, grave, decent, three-tail'd wig;
A coat full-trim'd, with button-holes behind,
Stiff be the ſkirts, with buckram ſtoutly lin'd;
The cloth cut-velvet, or more rev'rend black,
Full made, and powder'd half way down the back;
Large decent cuffs which near the ground may reach,
With half a dozen buttons fix'd on each;
Grave let his face be,—fix'd in ſolemn ſtate,—
He'll then ſtrike awe! He then will carry weight!
Cut out your Macaronies o'er and o'er,
And tho' but twenty-five, will ſeem three-ſcore!

As for addreſs—the ladder to renown,—
No ſettled maxim can be well laid down;
In this a different path each doctor treads;
'Tis beſt to follow where one's genius leads.
As this affair admits no ſingle ſample,
I'll ſet before you ſeveral.—For example,
* * * 's mute,—will laugh on no pretence;
Of courſe he paſſes for a man of ſenſe.

" He's

" He's thoughtful—grave!"—The proverb's on
his ſide,
That cloſe tongues and wiſe heads are near ally'd.
He'll ſuffer none to probe him, nor expoſe
(And there he's wiſe—!) the nothing that he knows.

* * the cool, obſerves another plan.
Extremely chatty—quite a woman's man;
Who by his light inſinuating arts,
(A perfect fribble!) charms the ladies hearts:
And 'tis confeſs'd, *his* maxim has its force,
The lady won, the huſband comes of courſe.

By other methods * * buſineſs gains;
Affects to take a mighty deal of pains;
Aſks you unmeaning queſtions out of number,
Then thinks about 'em till quite loſt in ſlumber;
Preſcription on preſcription, writes and breaks,
God knows to little purpoſe—but it takes!—

But tho' much buſineſs by *this* mode is won,
A conduct juſt the counter has its run;

* * his

* * his buſineſs does as at a race,
And hardly ſtays a minute at a place;
Writes his preſcriptions with ſuch rapid ſpeed,
'Twould puzzle ev'n the doctor's ſelf to read.
"Who ſhall we have—* * !—Ay, fetch him—go—
A man of vaſt great practice! He muſt know!"

* * (the Sire) affects with wondrous art
To have the patient's welfare much at heart;
Scolds the apothecary,—chides the nurſe,—
Vaſtly officious—makes a mighty fuſs;
Buſtles about as buſy as a bee;
In little trifles—how exact is he!
But view him!— Pulſe in one hand—watch in t'other—
Where ſhall we find for figure ſuch another!

* * at no perfection can arrive,
Yet even he has learnt the art to thrive;
The want of qualities to recommend him
Is paid by getting *nurſes* to befriend him;

With theſe he ſcrapes acquaintance—treats by heaps,
Bribes—kiſſes them—nay, one or two he keeps!
th 'pothecaries too his "friends all hail,"
But that you know's a trick both old and ſtale.*

I could deſcribe a hundred more than thoſe,
And all their arts and principles expoſe;
But now to buſineſs—As for claſſic lore,
Cambridge, France, Leyden, hoſpitals,——what more?
Baniſh theſe idle dreams,—illuſions ſtrong;
Here's the whole proceſs—here's the ſhort and long.
Bind him to ſome apothecary near
For four, or five, or half a dozen year',
There let him learn our Latin cant by heart,
And get a little ſmatt'ring in the art,
Then in his hand put half a hundred pound',
And tell him where old ❋ ❋'s to be found,
Your work is done—your ſon's diploma's gain'd!
Mine, Sir, was by this very means obtain'd.

* To prevent miſtakes, this doctor is not one of the college.

VICAR.

VICAR.

You ſtagger me!———————

PHYSICIAN.

———————Nor are theſe caſes ſcarce;
You form wrong notions—phyſic's all a farce—
Some who are in the world's eſteem moſt high
Got their degrees by juſt ſuch means as I.

VICAR.

Well, Sir!—I thank you much for your advice
Which yet to follow I'm perhaps too nice;
My notions, Sir,—may too romantic be—
But mark my ſentiments, I'll ſpeak them free.
Too much that ſcience cannot well be learn'd
In which our lives ſo deeply are concern'd;
And he that void of knowledge doth practiſe,
I call a mere aſſaſſin in diſguiſe.
Tho' on my ſon my whole eſtate I ſpend,
He ſtill ſhall ſtudy till he's gain'd his end:

Nor e'er in practice ſhall engage till ſtor'd
With all the art that tutors can afford.
Thus qualiſy'd I'll truſt to fate the reſt,
My duty's done, and I've a quiet breaſt;
And whether with ſucceſs or not he's crown'd,
He *ſhall* deſerve it—That ſhall be Tom's ground.

THE

THE LAMENTATION OF DR. STIFF. A DIALOGUE.

DR. PLIANT.

WELL met, my friend—but why this ſudden gloom?
No accident!———

DR. STIFF.

———Ah! Sir!—for grief I've room:
I'm juſt from BATSON's come, where once you know
It did my very entrails good to go.

BAT-

Batson's of old to phyſic gave the law;
The ſeat of learning, gravity, and awe;
But baniſh'd now is every medic' grace,
So chang'd!—I hate to go a-nigh the place.

When Hulse, when Turner grac'd the college vow,
(Ah! Brother!—We have no ſuch doctors now!)
Each ſon of Sol, to make him look more big,
Had on a large, grave, decent, three-tail'd wig: ‡
His coat full-trimm'd, with button-holes behind,
Stiff were the ſkirts, with buckram ſtoutly lin'd;
The cloth cut-velvet, or more reverend black,
Full made, and powder'd half way down the back;
Large decent cuffs, which near the ground did reach,
With half a dozen buttons fix'd on each.
Grave were their faces, fix'd in ſolemn ſtate,
Thoſe men ſtruck awe!—their preſence carry'd weight!
In rev'rend wigs old heads young ſhoulders bore,
And twenty-five, or thirty, ſeem'd three-ſcore.

‡ N. B. I have made free to borrow this deſcription in The Physicians.

Ah!

Ah! theſe *were* times—which we no more can boaſt;
The dignity of phyſic now is loſt!
Our preſent race—Oh! how unlike the paſt!
Mere Macaronies—quite a different caſt.
Their coats—mere jackets—made in taſte of froth,
And look—as if the taylor cribb'd the cloth;
No wigs!—or thoſe they have ſo vaſtly ſmall,
Carry no weight, no conſequence at all.
Curls on their ſides—toupees before you'll find,
With tails, like monkey's, dangling down behind;
Mirth in their faces!—and their only plan
To look as young as poſſibly they can.—

But what is worſe, thoſe doctors who e'er while
Dreſt to the height of Æſculapian ſtile,
Who once ſo warm the faſhion did oppoſe,
Are firſt to wear bag-wigs and foppiſh cloaths!
Br—y wore e'er dreſt in this diſguiſe
A wig of pretty tolerable ſize;
And W—th—n too till ſunk in like decline
Juſt ſuch another wig as yours or mine,

But

But now,—Oh! PLIANT!—ſhould old MUNCKLEY
riſe
And view their heads—he'd ſcarce believe his eyes!

To make my grief complete, the town—(which
loves
New faſhions like a child) the mode approves!
Sway'd by the taſte, ſome brother goes aſtray
Flies, and deſerts his colours, every day;
None will be left, dear PLIANT, by and by
To grace the cauſe of wigs, but you and I!

DR. PLIANT.

Sorry I am, my friend, for your miſchance,
But I—can't keep you long in countenance.
To ſay the truth, I very ſoon ſhall wear,
(See how 'tis grown!—) like B—y, my hair
Off goes my wig to-morrow—why, you ſtare!—
"Doctors of old (you tell us) wore large wigs,
"But they had ſenſe—unlike our modern priggs.—"
And 'twas but right if ſuch enlightened men
Wore wigs—as emblems of the ſenſe within.

But

But ſince (you ſay) we've no ſuch genii now,
Don't let us merely dreſs for outſide ſhow;
If we are void of their intrinſic worth,
Why let our dreſs be level with our birth.
The want of having well obſerv'd this rule,
Has brought your perukes into ridicule.
The Jay appear'd in no contemptuous light
Till he was ſeen in Peacock's feathers dight;
Since then to ſenſe (you ſay) we 're not a-kin—
I prithee let's appear like other men.

Yet wigs are not eſſential to the pate
Of men of parts, as you would imitate;
HIPPOCRATES and SYDENHAM wore no wig,
And yet you won't deny their ſenſe was big;
And HARVEY, who found out the circulation,
Was he a doctor of the peruke faſhion?—

When people lik'd no doctor in his hair,
I then in wig, like others, did appear;
But now the patients like 'em beſt without,
I'll even burn my wig and veer about.

I'll never ſtarve for ſake of vain parade,
While others run away with all the trade;
And if you'd live, and keep your folks together,
Throw off your wig, and vary with the weather.
For, take my word, a doctor very ſoon
Won't be employ'd, that has a caxon on,
In ſuch contempt and ridicule 'tis grown.

DR. STIFF.

What then!—will *you* the good old cauſe deſert!
Will nought your vile apoſtacy avert?—
Sail down the current then!—and ſee with ſhame
Me, and me only ſtrive againſt the ſtream.
Tho' I the butt of all the college live,
The ſport of boys as thro' the ſtreets I drive,
Who, overjoy'd, cry out in merry jig,
"A doctor ſee!—I know it by his wig."—
Yet ſtill I'll perſevere, I'll ſtill go on,
The honor more as 'twill be all my own:
Tho' all forſake thee, wig! yet will not I,
I'll perſevere, defend thee till I die:

Nay,

Nay, though I ſtarve, yet with my lateſt breath,
With head and heart I'll prize thee till my death.
I'll live the faithful ſubject to thy laws,
I'll bravely die—a martyr in thy cauſe!

ON WRITERS.

A DIALOGUE.

WRITTEN 1769.

FRIEND.

I'VE wonder'd at my leiſure hours
That in an age refin'd as ours,
No authors of ſuperior parts
Have ris'n to cultivate the arts,
Much more ſo as our gracious king
Is pleas'd to patronize the thing;
The age preceding ours could boaſt
Their DRYDEN, BUTLER, and a hoſt

Of

Of other bards of equal fame
Too numerous for me to name;
Yet no encouragement to thoſe
Was giv'n, but merely what aroſe
From ſelling what they wrote;—if plays
The paultry pittance of third days.
Freedom of preſs to us is granted
Beſides; which theſe great heroes wanted;
Which makes me wonder ſtill the more,
And beg you will the cauſe explore.

WRITER.

'Tis cauſe they've better work, my friend!
Your doubts, I hope, are at an end.

FRIEND.

Your anſwer may be very clever,
But yet my doubts are great as ever.

WRITER.

I need not, I preſume, unfold
What authors underwent of old;

It would be tedious too to tell
Their ills; beſides you know 'em well.
Writing in latter days is made
A very profitable trade,
Though not thoſe kinds of writing of
The age of which you ſpoke above;
Free preſs, on which you ſeem'd to dwell
As reaſon why we *ſhou'd* excel,
I mean to prove to be, point blunt
The very reaſon why we don't.

FRIEND.

Go on———

WRITER.

———Our nobles, whoſe eſtates
Should keep 'em from Saint JAMES's gates,
Whoſe fortunes without interruption
Should ſet them far above corruption,
By luxury and diſſipation
Are 'come the robbers of the nation!

FRIEND.

FRIEND.

Enough to give a man the ſtaggers!—
Noble's reduc'd to worſe than beggars!

WRITER.

Their fortunes, though God knows, immenſe
Yet fall far ſhort of their expence;
Though from the ſtocks their caſh is drawn,
Their great eſtates too laid in pawn;
The matter in the leaſt an't mended,
By other means they'll get befriended;
To any dirty work they'll ſtoop
Sooner than let their grandeur droop.
Now mark: Whene'er you ſee his grace
Bemean himſelf to take a place,
It is a ſign—(each courtier well knows)
That his eſtate is out at elbows;
And takes this method not in vain
To try to make it whole again.

Thus

Thus plac'd he muſt (like TWITCHER's paſtor,)
Devote his time to pleaſe his maſter,
Break laws, uſe arbitrary power,
And ſend oppoſers to the tower,
Do any thing to keep his places,
And fix himſelf in GEORGE's graces.
But as the freedom of the preſs
Let's every Engliſhman expreſs
His thoughts and ſentiments at pleaſure,
On every miniſter and meaſure,
In order to prevent the ills
That may ariſe from factious quills,
A ſet of writers they employ
To combat thoſe who dare annoy;
To praiſe; and what is more, by doſing
With gold, they keep them from oppoſing.
Us writers, have an office down
About the weſt end of the town;
There our artillery we play
In all the papers of the day,
And, faith, we've very handſome pay.

'Tis our's to ſave our maſter's bacon
In whatſoever ſteps they've taken.
To praiſe them when they do amiſs
And cry huzza when others hiſs;
In ſhort, whatever they deſire—
We only write what they inſpire.
But mind, they do not do this ſame,
For ſake of keeping up their fame,
But to preſerve them in their ſtation,
Still of its wealth to fleece the nation;
For when his fortune once more ſhines,
'Tis then good b'w'ye—his grace reſigns!
His debts are paid—his dunn's made calm—
Devil for him may take the helm.

FRIEND.

If this be true, I think plain ſenſe
Tells us they're at a vaſt expence;
Theſe chaps muſt bring 'em in account to
More than their ſalaries amount to;

I won-

I wonder how they make it anſwer!—

WRITER.

If you can't tell, I b'lieve I can, Sir;
Not from the pocket of his grace
The caſh comes, but another place;
'Twould make you ſtare ſhould I relate
What ſums were ſpent on a debate
Which made ſo great a noiſe of late;*
'Twas, "Come, my lads, this here's tough work,
"Juſt following too upon MAC QUIRK.
"But here—lay hold—a golden muſe
"Inſpires conviction—don't refuſe—
"Whene'er you want to write a theme
"Come to the Heliconian ſtream."—
Good God! What doubts and cares oppreſt,
And rag'd and tore his tortur'd breaſt!
I learnt to pity men in pow'r,
God knows my heart, from that ſame hour.

* WILKES's expulſion.

FRIEND.

Was I ſtateſman I'd retire
Sooner than raiſe the nation's ire;
What's wealth and pow'r, great name and place
If they're enjoy'd but with diſgrace?

WRITER.

But when a nobleman's affairs
Depend on places for repairs,
To theſe things he muſt turn deaf ears.
'Tis this by which we writers live!
Freedom of preſs you ſee does give
A bleſſing you could not conceive.
Scholars are now on purpoſe bred
To write, 'tis got ſo good a trade;
At Oxford you may ſee great plenties;
They flock to town by tens and twenties;
The miniſtry can ſcarce get hands
Enough to anſwer their demands!

No ſcholar now turns ſtarving poet,
Here's better branches, and they know it;
Only demonſtrate that you're clever,
And then your fortune's made forever.

FRIEND.

What then!—can writers take a pleaſure
In juſtify'ng a wicked meaſure?
Will they prefer news-paper fame
Before the poet's generous flame?
Will they for gold oppoſe the laws?
If ſo I muſt give up the cauſe.

WRITER.

I wonder at the ſpeech you made;
Blame none for working at his trade.

FRIEND.

But then the king will find 'em corks,
If they'll but write immortal works.

WRITER.

WRITER.

The miniſtry will pay them better
For writing but a ſingle letter:
And would not you with all your boaſt
Work for the man that pay'd you moſt?

FRIEND.

Such dirty jobbs as are theſe ſame!
Writers ſhould have regard to fame.

WRITER.

Fame was but us'd by bards of old
To get them buſineſs, and then gold.
Now they can get gold without fame,
They do not ev'n make known their name;
Freedom of preſs was the beſt news
That ever happen'd for the muſe;
Thoſe bards who might have ſtarv'd before
Now keep their carriage and their whore!

When

When trade is dead, we take our pen,
And write againſt thoſe very men
That paid us wages, purpoſely
To get ourſelves into employ;
Keep up the conteſt juſt as long
As we pleaſe, ſelf 'gainſt ſelf, ding dong;
While money floweth in galore;
And when we've got enough give o'er;
The conteſt then is heard no more.

FRIEND.

Well, Sir! — Thoſe things which now I'm taught of,
I'm ſure I never ſhould have thought of!
While things continue in this wiſe,
Deſpair of ſeeing genius riſe.
No poet more will grace our iſle,
The muſes now will ceaſe to ſmile;
For now their ſervants are bought off
The muſes will be turn'd to ſcoff,
Shame on the great, who SANS remorſe
Thus turn a bleſſing to a curſe.

THE PREFACE TO A SPECIMEN OF AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE MIND.

THE foregoing verſes were deſigned for the many. What follows is intended only for a few; though it is on its account that I have now appeared in print.

Had I publiſhed the following alone, there are ſo few who read ſubjects of this kind, that the ſale of it would not have defrayed the expences of publication; therefore the reader will pardon me for having recourſe to this artifice.

I have by me a ſeries of propoſitions concerning the mind, which regard it both as it is a paſſive or preceptive; and alſo as it is an active being.

The following are given as a ſpecimen.

Not

Not that they are the moſt ſhinging among them; but becauſe they are the only ones that could conveniently be given independent of the reſt. If they are approved, I may then open a ſubſcription for publiſhing the remainder.

SPECIMEN

OF AN

ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE MIND.

OF SENSATION.

PROPOSITION XV.

That the Mind is extended.

(BY the *mind* I mean the ſoul; or that ſubſtance within us which perceives. Some I know underſtand by the word *mind*, the whole connected parcel of our ideas. But I by this word mean no other than that being, or ſubſtance, by which the ideas are perceived, without regard to the ideas themſelves. In other words, the mind is a being capable of perception, or of having ſenſations excited in it.)

The

The leading proof of this is drawn from the preceding propoſitions. It appears, however, from the following:

(1.) The mind can perceive ſenſations which have length and breadth. It can perceive ſenſations of very different ſizes. And that either, (2.) ſucceſſively; or (3.) at the ſame time, as may be eaſily exemplified, by viſion or feeling: and it can, at the ſame time, perceive ſenſations of different ſenſes. Now all ſenſations are in the mind which perceives them, they being in fact excited in the ſubſtance thereof.

Length and breadth occupy ſpace; and of conſequence the mind muſt; for otherwiſe, how could an extended ſenſation be excited therein?

In the third caſe it is plain, that the mind is extended, becauſe different parts of it may be affected, or different extended ſenſations may be excited in various parts thereof at the ſame time.

And

And in the ſecond caſe a larger or ſmaller portion of the mind may be affected. Alſo the nerves, which cauſe thoſe ſenſations, are not only extended or bulky, but at ſome diſtance from each other in the mind; and not one only, but many of them are required, for cauſing a viſual ſenſation for example. All which conſiderations put it beyond doubt, that the mind is not unextended, as is commonly believed.

Part of PROPOSITION XVII.

The Mind is not indiviſible, as is commonly believed, but compoſed of particles.

FOR if the mind was one united indiviſible ſubſtance, it would be abſolutely rigid and inflexible; and therefore an action of the nerves on any particular part of it, would not merely affect, and ſo cauſe a ſenſation in that part, but the whole mind would be equally affected; as is obvious to mathematicians; whereas this by no means appears

by

by experience. For if a ſmall circle be painted on the eye, by the leaſt refrangible rays of light, the affected nerves cauſe a ſmall red circle in the mind; the ſenſation extending little or nothing beyond thoſe parts which are immediately affected. But if the mind was indiviſible, not merely a ſmall red circle would be perceived, but every part of the mind would be equally affected with a red colour, &c.

Proposition XX.

Abſolute Time is contracted with regard to the Mind.

TIME, with regard to our minds, is not infinitely diviſible, but limitted. The twelfth part of a ſecond, for example, is nothing to us. A ſecond, however, is time; a minute a longer time; and an hour ſtill longer. And particles of time, as they are longer than ſuppoſe the tenth, twelfth, or thereabout, of a ſecond, are, with regard to the mind, to be reckoned as from nothing;

as

as 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c. This, I ſay, is the caſe with regard to the mind: But in nature the twelfth of a ſecond is as much an affirmative; and is as juſtly and clearly diviſible to infinity as a ſecond, a minute, or an hour, as is well known to mathematicians. If a certain particle of time be ſuppoſed to be nothing, then all particles which are larger than that will be affirmative; and thoſe which are leſs than that, negative, which may be carried on each ſide of the cypher to infinity. The particle thus fixed on for the cypher is merely arbitrary; for one may be aſſumed as well as another.

Now this principle obtains in the mind. A certain part of a ſecond is nothing to us, becauſe it is pitched upon for the cypher. Times which are greater than this cypher are perceivable by us; but times which are leſs than it, are not; and this cypher I call "the time of perception."

That this is the caſe with the mind, will appear plain to him who conſiders that a ſecond of time is perceiveable by us; but that the time in which a ray of light performs its vibration, though this is done with as little real hurry as the vibration of a ſecond pendulum, or the moſt deliberate of our actions, is yet nothing to us; the former being larger; the latter ſmaller than the time of perception.

The reaſon of this limitation of time, with regard to the mind, will appear in the ſequel. But as it was ſaid above, that the particle of time fixed on for the cypher is merely arbitrary, it is proper to obſerve, that the reaſon why the twelfth, or thereabout, (for I have not yet been able to determine exactly what this particle is) of a ſecond is allotted for our time of perception, rather than a greater or leſs particle, is that it might be ſuited to the actions of our bodies. For if the time of perception was either an hour, or the thouſandth part

part of a ſecond, and the actions of our bodies as they are, how inconſiſtent and abſurd would ſuch union of perception and action be! Some animals may have their time of perception ſlower than us; and others, eſpecially inſects and animalculæ, ſwifter; ſuitable to their ſeveral actions.

The cauſe of this property of the mind, I deſign for the ſubject of ſome future propoſition. It is proper to obſerve, however, that it does not at all depend on ideas or experience, but is an original property of the mind, and belonged to it before it was poſſeſſed of ideas. Thus, for example, it will be ſhown by and by, that we could have no perception of colours, ſounds, and other of our ſenſations, that is, theſe ſenſations could not be excited in our minds, if they were not veil'd with the forementioned property; and yet no philoſopher will now deny that thoſe ſenſations were antecedent to their ideas. Alſo this property is fixed, or invariable, as will be ſhown in the ſequel; for elſe the ſame time of vibration would

not always cauſe the ſame note of ſound, as we find to be the caſe. The reader, therefore, will be careful not to confound this property of the mind with the "ſucceſſion of ideas," (which relates to the mind-active, and according as it is ſwifter or ſlower, makes time ſeem to run away more or leſs ſwiftly) but conſider it as an original, and invariable property of the mind-paſſive or ſoul, it really is, The mind-active is at preſent entirely out of the queſtion. I have now nothing to do with ideas or experience. I only conſider the mind as it is originally; a ſubſtance capable of having ſenſations excited in it; and the actions of the nerves on it, for cauſing thoſe ſenſations.

PROPOSITION XXI.

Space is limited in like manner as hath been ſhown of Time, with regard to the Mind.

SPACE, as well as time, are naturally diviſible to infinity. But if a circle be thrown on the eye, half as big as the whole retina, a circular ſpot,

ſpot will be painted in the mind of a given bigneſs. If the diameter of the circle in the eye be diminiſhed by degrees, the circle perceived by the mind, will not only become leſs and leſs, but when it becomes of a given ſmallneſs, will abſolutely diſappear. Yet certainly there are no bounds in nature for the diminution of a circle; for there it may be diminiſhed, as well as increaſed, infinitely. But as this is not the caſe, with regard to the mind; and ſince it appears that a ſpot painted there, leſs than a given ſize, is imperceptible, it follows, that in the mind the ſame thing holds good, with regard to ſpace, as hath been ſhown of time. A certain particle of ſpace is fixed on for the cypher; and all ſenſations in the mind, which are larger than that, are perceivable; but all ſenſations which are leſs than that, are not perceivable, in like manner, as was ſhown of the particles of time, in the laſt propoſition. This property of the mind is, as well as the preceding one, original; and for the ſame reaſons. It is likewiſe invariable. The cypher of ſpace, as well as of time,

may

may be different in various ſpecies of animals, ſuited to their ſize, and other particulars of their formation.

Scholium.

If a portion of natural ſpace, or, which is the ſame thing in effect, a piece of ſolid matter of a given bulk, be divided into one million of equal parts, each of theſe parts will continue to have exiſtance, and will retain its due proportion to the whole, it will not be annihilated. But if a viſual ſenſation, which is equal to ten thouſand minimæ, or leaſt perceptible points, be divided into one milion of equal parts, each of theſe parts taken ſeparately will be inviſible; that is, with regard to perception, be annihilated. The like ſpoken of time may be applied to the laſt propoſition. The force of the argument will be readily comprehended by the learned reader. I have not expreſſed my meaning, perhaps, ſo clearly as I conceive it; but if the two laſt propoſitions be duly conſider-

ed,

ed, I believe the reader will be able to underſtand them from what is ſaid; and I think he will find them to be as extraordinary in their nature, as any that have yet been diſcovered.

Proposition XXII.

To deſcribe the principal Effects which the two laſt Propoſitions have on the Mind.

THE mind appears to be eſtabliſhed under ſuch circumſtances, as that a certain particle of time, and alſo of ſpace, are to it mere nullities; that particles of time and ſpace, which are larger than theſe, are perceivable by the mind; but that thoſe which are leſs, are imperceptible. The particles of ſpace and of time, which are the next, leſs than the leaſt perceptible ones, I call cyphers, and the leaſt percepticle particles themſelves, I call "points of ſpace, and inſtants of time."

The

The mind, by reaſon that it is an extended durable ſubſtance, might be conſidered as great or ſmall, and ſo infinitely, according to what the compariſon is made from, the ſame as other ſubſtances, or portions of ſpace. Thus, it is ſmall, when compared to a ſubſtance abſolutely larger; and large, when compared with a ſubſtance or ſpace abſolutely ſmaller, proportionally. But by means of the contracted ſpace, the mind is, with regard to itſelf, reduced to a given bounds or dimenſions; and its bulk is equal to the number of points of ſpace of which it is compoſed. Hence, if the cyphers of ſpace were twice as large as at preſent, the mind remaining of the ſame abſolute bulk, would, with regard to itſelf, be but half as large as it is now; and if the cyphers of ſpace were but half as large as at preſent, the mind, with regard to itſelf, would be twice as large as it now is. The like may be obſerved of a given portion of time, larger than the time of perception; (as a ſecond, or a minute) for example: Suppoſing

poſing the cypher of time to be altered in like manner. For if the cypher of time be twice as large as at preſent, a ſecond, or minute of time, would be but half as long as at preſent; and if the cypher was but half as large, a ſecond, or a minute of time would be twice as long as now.

It was ſhewn in propoſition xvii, that the mind is compoſed of particles. Now if a cypher of ſpace be ſo large as to comprehend ſeveral, or many of the particles of the mind, as in ſome following propoſitions will appear to be the caſe, the mind's particles, are, by this contrivance, made to vaniſh away, and become ſingly too ſmall to be perceptible. So likewiſe, if pulſes act on the mind, which are ſwifter than the time of perception, thoſe pulſes will not ſeparately be perceived; being buried, or made to vaniſh away, by the cypher of time, in like manner as the mind's particles are by the cypher of ſpace. From hence ariſeth a plenum or monad, yet compoſed of parts:

A ſubſtance at reſt, and yet in a ſtate of vibration (from the action of thoſe ſwift pulſes :) And, in ſhort, a ſubſtance of ſuch a nature as has not yet been conceived. Philoſophers will form a much better idea of it from theſe premiſes, than I can deſcribe.

SCHOLIUM.

I cannot help obſerving here, that theſe two propoſitions ſettle the famous diſpute concerning the infinite diviſibility of time and ſpace.

Time and ſpace are in themſelves diviſible to infinity. But with regard to our minds, they are not ſo. For in this caſe the points of ſpace, and inſtants of time deſcribed above, are the leaſt poſſible, and of courſe no farther diviſible.

Mathematicians therefore, who inſiſt on the infinite diviſibility of time and ſpace, are right; provided they mean time and ſpace as they are in

in nature, without regard to the mind. And metaphyſicians, who inſiſt on the contrary, are right, provided they mean time and ſpace, as they are perceived by the mind, and not as they are in nature.

Proposition XXIII.

The Particles of which the Mind is compoſed, are, by Means of certain Actions on them, convertible into Particles of our Senſations; which are different, according as the Particles are differently acted on.

I Think that by this time no argument is required, to ſhew that ſenſation is to be conſidered in a mere mechanical light, like the other phœnomena of nature. The leaſt refrangible rays of light, acting on the mind, by means of the optic nerves, cauſe a red colour; which is invariably, and at all times the ſame, and is a phœnomenon as conſtant and exact as any in nature; inſomuch

that the colour thus excited, cannot be in the leaſt changed without altering the cauſes by which it is made. The colour is cauſed by the vibration excited in the nerves, by the rays of light acting on the mind, as is obvious; becauſe if the time of vibration be altered, the colour will be changed in the ſame proportion. (Vide prop. vi, vii, viii, ix.) The vibrating nerves muſt act with ſufficient force on the mind, before a ſenſation can be cauſed, as was ſhown in prop. xii & xiii. And after the force in the mind is overcome, the ſenſation is then ſtronger, in proportion to the ſuperior action of the nerves. From whence it is plain, that the ſenſation is owing to nothing more than the mechanical action of the nerves on the ſubſtance of the mind. The particles of the mind therefore, are of ſuch a nature, as that being acted on by theſe nerves, the ſenſation of red colour is excited in them. Or if you will, the particles themſelves are, by ſuch action of the nerves, turned into particles of the red colour which we perceive.

What

What has been ſaid of colour holds equally good with the other ſenſations. But be it obſerved, that what I ſay of the mind, with regard to its particles being convertible into particles of our ſenſations, is to be underſtood of theſe particles, as under the influence of the xxth and xxiſt propoſitions.

Philoſophers have not yet pretended to explain the nature of the internal ſubſtance of bodies. But this doctrine leads us to the conſideration of the very ſubſtance of the particles of which the mind is compoſed.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

To explain the Phænomena of the Plenum and Continuum of a viſual Senſation, and thereby ratify the Truth of the foregoing Propoſitions.

IF I hold a ſheet of paper before me, though it is certain that there are not only pores in the paper, but alſo ſpaces between the nerves, which convey the ſenſation to the mind; and even that the mind itſelf, which perceives the ſenſation is porous; yet I cannot diſcern the leaſt pore in the paper, but the ſenſation which it gives me is a perfect plenum, or an entire whole.

So likewiſe it is certain, that there are intervals of time between the pulſes of the rays by which the ſenſation is cauſed; and yet the colour appears without the leaſt intermiſſion; nor is it even intended or remitted in force; but is a moſt perfect and uniform continuum. Theſe are certainly moſt ſtupenduous phœnomena if rightly conſidered;

ed; but yet are eaſy to be explained by the foregoing principles. Thus; ſince by prop. xxi, (the mind's particles being made to vaniſh away, and become ſingly imperceptible) the mind is, with regard to itſelf, a plenous ſubſtance, it is obvious, that if its particles are turned into particles of colour, the perception ariſing therefrom muſt be plenous.

And ſince it appears, from the xxth propoſition, that pulſes which are ſwifter than the time of perception (being in like manner made to vaniſh away, and become imperceptible ſingly) are with regard to the mind continuous; it is plain, that a ſenſation cauſed by the pulſes, of the rays of light, muſt alſo be continuous.

Having eſtabliſhed theſe propoſitions, I now proceed to enquire by what means ſenſations are excited, in the particles of the mind; and what actions on them are requiſite for turning them into particles of our different ſenſations.

Proposition XXX.

Our Senſations, however different they appear, are all of them compoſed of the ſame Ingredient.

THIS, in the original, is deduced chiefly from preceding propoſitions, which treat of the manner in which the mind's particles are turned into particles of our different ſenſations. It will, however, appear from what follows, though not in ſo ſtrong a light.

Suppoſe that for a ſenſible portion of time a vibration exiſts in the air, at the rate of 400 pulſes in a ſecond; and for another ſenſible portion of time a vibration at the rate of 200: and ſuppoſe that only the firſt pulſe of each of theſe vibrations be ſuffered to affect the mind; the ſucceeding ones being hindered by whatever cauſe. If the ſtrength of theſe two pulſes be equal, their effects on the mind will be ſimilar. But yet, if all the pulſes of each vibration be ſuffered to affect the mind, there will

will be a ſound cauſed by the pulſes which exiſted in the firſt portion of time; and there will likewiſe be a ſound cauſed by the pulſes which exiſted in the ſecond portion of time*; but with this difference, that the tone of the former ſound will be juſt an octave higher than that of the latter.

Now ſeeing that the effect of the firſt pulſe of each vibration on the mind, when they acted alone, was the ſame, and of courſe the ſenſation which they excited, was the ſame; and ſeeing alſo, that the tones of the ſounds cauſed by the two vibrations, were not the ſame, but different in proportion to the times of the vibrations, and of courſe depended on the ſwiftneſs with which the pulſes returned on the mind; the ſenſation which the two ſingle pulſes excited was not ſound, but ſome other ſenſation. And the ſenſation which was excited by the pulſes of the two vibrations, taken ſeparate-

* We rank theſe under the common name of ſounds, and call them different tones of ſound. But, ſtrictly ſpeaking, they are different ſenſations, even as ſound, colour, &c. are. Only the difference is a vaſt deal leſs in the former caſe than in the latter. The like may be obſerved of colours, taſtes, &c.

ly, was alſo not ſound, but the ſame ſenſation as was excited by the two ſingle pulſes, and the appearance of the ſenſation excited by the pulſes of the two vibrations, under the form of a ſound, was owing to the pulſes having ſucceeded one another, and the appearance of it, under the form of a ſound, of a higher tone in the former caſe than in the latter, was owing to the pulſes having ſucceeded one another in leſſer times in the former caſe, than in the latter.

The ſenſation therefore, which was excited by the two ſingle pulſes, and of courſe that of which the two ſounds were compoſed, was a certain ſenſation which is liable to be excited in the ſubſtance of the mind; and which I ſhall call "ſimple ſenſation."

If then we conſider the mind, as abſtracted from the properties deſcribed in the xxth and xxiſt propoſitions, the ſenſation excited by a ſingle pulſe is not ſound; neither is the ſenſation excited by the aërial pulſes in ſucceſſion ſound; but the ſimple ſenſation. And it appears to us under the form

of

of ſound, when excited by the ſonorific pulſes, by reaſon that the mind is under the influence of the xxth and xxiſt propoſitions. For, as for that reaſon, the mind cannot diſtinguiſh the effects of theſe pulſes ſeparately, or in other words, it cannot diſtinctly perceive the ſenſation excited by each ſingle pulſe, the whole appears under the form of a continued ſound. And as it can for the ſame reaſon leſs diſtinctly perceive the effects of each ſingle pulſe when the pulſes return ſwifter, therefore the continuum is then more perfect; and by conſequence the tone of the ſound (which depends on the perfection of the continuum) higher in proportion as the pulſes return more ſwiftly. (The time in which the mind perceives obſerve, is not the cypher, but the mental inſtant of time deſcribed in propoſition xxiid).

From hence it appears, that in order to cauſe ſound, the pulſes muſt not return in greater times than the time of perception; and that the firſt ſound, reckoning upwards, is cauſed when the

pulſes begin to return in leſſer times than that. Alſo it appears, that in order to cauſe the leaſt poſſible portion of ſound, the pulſes muſt continue to return on the mind for at leaſt one mental inſtant of time.

Hence likewiſe we may obſerve, that if the time of perception be ſuppoſed variable, the tone of a ſound cauſed by a given vibration will be variable in the ſame proportion. If, for example, the particle of time made the mind's cypher, was twice as large as at preſent, the tone of the ſound cauſed by pulſes at the rate of 100 in a ſecond, would be an octave higher than now; and if the ſaid particle was but half as large as it is now, the tone of the ſound cauſed by the ſame pulſes, would be an octave under the preſent. And if the time of perception was leſs than the one-hundredth part of a ſecond, the ſame pulſes acting on the mind would cauſe no ſound; the pulſes, in order to produce that effect being required to be ſwifter than the time of perception. Since then the ſame time of vibra-

vibration always cauſeth a ſound of the ſame tone, it follows, that the time of perception is invariable, according as was affirmed in the xxth propoſition.

From what has been ſaid it appears, that all ſounds, however different in tone, are only as many different appearances of the ſimple ſenſation which is liable to be excited in the ſubſtance of the mind; that is, of an ingredient, which, if the mind be abſtracted from the influence of the xxth and xxiſt propoſitions, admits of no other variation than of ſtrength or denſity, or of being excited more or leſs ſtrongly or denſely; its nature in other reſpects being always the ſame.

And that this is the caſe with ſounds will likewiſe appear, by comparing it with the phœnomena.

Thus, 1. "The tones of ſounds are proportional to the times of the vibrations which cauſe them, being higher in proportion as thoſe times

times are leſs." And it has been ſhown above, that theſe tones depend on the number of pulſes which affect the mind in one mental inſtant of time; that is, they are higher in proportion to the number of times that the ſimple ſenſation has been excited in that time.

2. "That with the ſame time of vibration, the ſound is ſtronger when the aërial pulſes are ſtronger, and weaker when theſe pulſes are more gentle." For when pulſes act more forcibly on the mind, they muſt needs excite the ſimple ſenſation more powerfully than when their action is weak; and the ſtrength of the ſound is as the quantity of ſimple ſenſation excited by the pulſes, provided their times remain the ſame *.

3. "That

* 'Tis proper to obſerve, with regard to this and the following phœnomenon, that, as when light is too denſe, the pupil contracts, and does not admit the rays to the retina, in proportion to the quantity that flows from the object; ſo ſomething of the ſame kind obtains in the ear. On which account the proportions do not hold exact; that is, the mind is not affected, nor of courſe the ſound ſtrong in the direct proportion

3. " That with the ſame force of aërial pulſes, the ſound is ſtronger when the pulſes return more ſwiftly, and weaker when they return more ſlowly." For the ſtrength of the ſound is proportional to the quantity of ſimple ſenſation, which exiſts in a given portion of the mind, in one mental inſtant of time. And therefore, ſuppoſing the pulſes to act on the mind with equal force, the quantity of ſimple ſenſation, excited in a mental inſtant of time, will be as the ſwiftneſs with which the pulſes return.

4. " Pulſes, till they become of a certain ſwiftneſs, cauſe no ſound." For, in order to produce that effect, they are required to return on the mind in leſſer times than the time of perception.

tion to the force of the aërial pulſes, nor as the pulſes with the ſame force return more ſwiftly. I have therefore expreſſed the phœnomena accordingly. But with ſo much of the effects of theſe pulſes as are conveyed to the mind, the proportion holds good; one allowance only being made on account of a certain property of the mind not here deſcribed; but which will be explained when the remainder of theſe propoſitions appear.

5. " The

5. "The tone of a ſound cauſed by a given vibration is always the ſame." For the tone of the ſound depends on the proportion which the times of the return of the pulſes on the mind bears to the time of perception. And as that is invariable, ſo muſt alſo the tone of the ſound cauſed by a given vibration.

6. "The tone of the ſound is always the ſame with the ſame time of vibration, whether the pulſes are ſtronger or weaker; and only the ſtrength thereof will be variable." For the tone of the ſound depends on the number of pulſes affecting the mind in one mental inſtant of time; but the ſtrength thereof, on the force with which thoſe pulſes ſtrike the mind; that is, on the quantity of ſimple ſenſation, excited by each pulſe, as before. And there are many other phœnomena of ſounds which may be explained by theſe principles, and which I have explained in the original work. But theſe are, I preſume, ſufficient for the preſent purpoſe.

What

What has been ſaid of ſounds holds good alſo with regard to colours. For colours are cauſed by the vibrations of the rays of light communicated to the mind by means of the optic nerves, as is plain, becauſe if the time of vibration be altered, the colour will be varied in the ſame proportion. If we ſuppoſe an optic nerve to give but one pulſe on the mind, it will not be denied that the effect of it will be the ſame as of a ſingle pulſe of an auditory nerve, which affected the mind with equal force; and therefore the ſenſation excited by the colorific vibrations, taken ſingly, is not colour, but the very ſame ſenſation as excited by the ſound, making vibrations taken ſingly. If likewiſe we ſuppoſe the mind to be diveſted of its properties of contracted time and ſpace, the ſenſation excited by the colorific pulſes in ſucceſſion will not be colour, but the very ſimple ſenſation above deſcribed; and which therefore appears to us under the form of colour, by reaſon that the mind is under the influence of the xxth and xxiſt

propoſitions; and the tone of the colour is higher according to the ſwiftneſs of the vibration, for the ſame reaſon as was given for the tones of ſounds being higher in proportion to the ſwiftneſs of the ſonorific vibrations; which ſee.

Now, ſince it appears that theſe two ſenſations of ſound and colour, ſo vaſtly unlike in their appearance, are yet compoſed of the ſame ingredient, ſince the other ſenſations are by no means more different from ſounds than colours are. And ſince alſo the action of the nerves for cauſing thoſe ſenſations, may be preſumed to be not very different from that of the optic and auditory nerves, thoſe, as well as theſe, acting either by pulſes, or by force, exerted ſome how or other on the mind, we may conclude,

"That all our ſenſations are only as many different forms under which the ſimple ſenſation appears, on account of its being differently excited by

by the action of the nerves conſidered in ſucceſſion, the mind being under the influence of the xxth and xxiſt propoſitions hereof."

SCHOLIUM to the Whole.

What I have here given, is but a very ſmall part of the propoſitions I have by me, concerning the mind; and theſe, by reaſon that they are publiſhed without the reſt, appear to great diſadvantage; particularly the xxxth, for the reaſon given at the beginning of it. I have diſcovered other properties of the mind than theſe, and have made uſe of them in conjunction with thoſe here given, for explaining many phœnomena of ſenſation, animation, and of the mind-active. Other parts of philoſophy have, within about a century paſt, been carried almoſt to their utmoſt perfection; this alone has remained uncultivated; owing perhaps to the mind's not having been conſidered in a phyſical light, nor enquired into on the ſame principles as are employed on other ſubjects of

natural philoſophy. Whether or no I have ſucceeded in the attempt, is left for the critic to determine, from the ſpecimen here given. I would beg of him, however, not to determine too haſtily; but conſider attentively the xxth and xxiſt propoſitions in particular; which from the ſtrangeneſs of their aſpects he may be induced, at firſt ſight, to reject.

The xviith propoſition has been advanced by ſome, (though not, that I know of, the proof of it;) but as ſtrongly oppoſed by others; and is not even now received by the learned. The beſt argument that I remember to have met with againſt it is, that (for ſufficient reaſons given by the objectors) the mind muſt be a monad. The xxiſt propoſition, I preſume, reconciles theſe two opinions.

When I ſay that the xxth and xxiſt propoſition, are original properties of the mind, I only mean, that

that they do not depend on ideas or experience. I do not mean that they are eſſential to the mind's ſubſtance; but as I may hereafter explain.

The propoſition which affirms that our ſenſations are all compoſed of the ſame ingredient, however paradoxical it may ſeem, (and yet I ſhould think it will not ſeem ſo paradoxical to him who conſiders that bodies, many of which are not leſs different in appearance than colours and ſounds, are all compoſed of the ſame ingredient, viz. matter;) yet is a concluſion which cannot be avoided, if the xxth propoſition be admitted. And that propoſition, though it may appear ſtill more ſtrange than the other, is, I preſume, ſupported by ſuch arguments that it will not be denied by thoſe who properly conſider them.

It will appear in the courſe of the work (if publiſhed) that the ſubſtance of which the mind

is

is compoſed, has many properties in common with matter. But that ſurpriſing property of its being liable to have the ſimple ſenſation excited in it, is peculiar to itſelf, and is not alſo a property of matter. I have diſcovered an argument which will make this appear; and by conſequence overthrow all the arguments which have been advanced, to ſhew that matter and the mental ſubſtance are the ſame.

In the original xxxth propoſition I have endeavoured to ſhew the manner in which, and the laws by which the ſimple ſenſation is exited in the ſubſtance of the mind. And have likewiſe attempted to inveſtigate, as far as our preſent experience will admit, the particular manner in which this ingredient is excited, when it appears to us under the form of this or that ſenſation.

The reaſon why the theory of ſenſation has hitherto remained in the dark, and even been deem-

ed

ed unattainable by us, is our not having been acquainted with the xxth propoſition hereof; but conſidering the phœnomena of the limitation of time, as the effect of the ſucceſſion of our ideas. The conſideration that colours, ſounds, and other ſenſations are prior to their ideas, and by conſequence to the ſucceſſion of theſe ideas; which ſenſations do yet depend on this property of the mind, (as hath been ſhown, and will appear more evidently in the original work); will, I preſume, ſhow this to have been a miſtake.

I ſhould now proceed to lay before the reader the numerous diſadvantages, on account of my ſituation in life, under which I have proſecuted theſe enquiries; and from thence draw an excuſe or apology for the incorrectneſs of what I have here publiſhed, as well as for any philoſophical errors, which, through want of leiſure, for due examination, may have eſcaped me. But I decline that for the preſent; and ſhall conclude with deſiring,

deſiring, that, if this ſpecimen be approved, no one will proceed on any principle, or hint herein delivered, till I have publiſhed the remainder of theſe propoſitions.

REMARKS.

Page 12, verſe 11, for *engliſh* read *engliſh'd*. Pag. 12, ver. 14, for *raiſe* read *riſe*. Pag. 13, ver. 11, for *, *, *, read **, *, ver. 15, for *with* read *in*. Pag. 17, ver. 5, for *!* read *?* Pag. 18, in the note, for *prent* read *prevent*. Pag. 18, ver. 2. — "one or two he keeps."

This *charitable* doctor (if the author is *rightly* informed) conſtantly maintains, at his own expence, one or two *nurſes*,— "who by *old age* are rendered *incapable of keeping themſelves*—!—"

Page 19, ver. 12, to—"*diſguiſe*"—add "*His tricks for getting buſineſs — I deſpiſe.*" Pag. 25, ver. 12. for *imitate* read *intimate*. Pag. 63, line 14. What is ſaid of the *viſible* may be applied to the *tangible* plenum and continuum, &c.

Pag. 65, line 14. By the *ſimple ſenſation* I do not mean *feeling*, as ſome may imagine, but as I may hereafter ſhew.

Pag. 69, line 4. The like may be obſerved of the variation of colour. Hence too the rays of light might be made to cauſe ſounds; and aërial vibrations colours. But of this hereafter.